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THE OVERWORKED CANADIAN?
BRIAN ALEXANDER LANGILLE*

INTRODUCTION

Juliet Schor's paper, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the FairLabor StandardsAct,' builds upon and carries forward the
themes and arguments developed at length in her widely read and admired book The Overworked American.2 The paper does this by enlarging upon a specific set of proposals suggested in that book for
reform of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 My role in commenting
upon this paper is to bring to bear the perspectives of a Canadian
labor lawyer. Thus I am an outsider in two senses: first, as a lawyer
commenting upon the work of an economist; and second, as a Canadian commenting on American data and proposals for legal reform.
There is danger in asking outsiders to comment upon domestic affairs.
It is reported that an American news reporter once asked Ghandi
what he thought of Western civilization. Ghandi is reported to have
replied that he thought it would be a very good idea. I will not be as
bold as Ghandi in my assessment and will simply attempt to bring to
bear Canadian experience and Canadian law as a focus for comparison. I will also offer some general comments on an idea fundamental
to Schor's paper-that is, the idea that meaningful workplace reform
can be achieved through general statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act.
I do think it is extremely important to see Schor's paper on the
Fair Labor Standards Act as a specific addendum to the work contained in her book. For this reason I intend to review the basic structural arguments of the larger work prior to setting out the specific
proposals for law reform contained in the paper. Then I will draw
attention to Canadian parallels to, or divergencies from, the empirical
and legal realities Schor describes. The concluding section will address the general issue of the efficacy of the sort of reform which
Schor proposes.
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context" Amending the Fair Labor Stan-

dards Act, 70 Cni.-KErr L. REV. 157 (1995).
2. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: TiH
suRE (1992) [hereinafter OVERWORKED AMERICAN].
3. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1989).
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THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN-THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF
SCHOR'S ARGUMENT

Schor's book is a great read. It hits home for many of us because
it speaks to something we all know to be true and perhaps especially
those of us who work in the legal profession. Our profession is struggling with an addiction to long hours of work and the impact of that
reality upon the lives of lawyers, especially young lawyers, and even
more especially young women and those thinking of raising a family.
Many of us are directly or indirectly familiar with this professional
reality. What Schor shows us is that this world is a very common one,
not only to those of us in the legal profession, but to those in the
workforce in general.
As I see it, the book has the following three part structure. First,
through an impressive empirical analysis the book gives detailed
shape to the intuition we all share, that our jobs are beginning to
crowd out the rest of our lives. The central claim here is that over the
past 20 years the amount of time Americans have spent at the job has
risen steadily contrary to expectations, theory, and experience elsewhere. 4 The most startling figure is that between 1969 and 1987 fulltime employees increased their working time, on average, by 163
hours per year, or more than one more month per year.5 While there
has been some increase in the hours which each full-time labor force
participant has worked per week, much of the increase is due to the
fact that more weeks are being worked per year. 6 The other key empirical points made by Schor in the book are, for our purposes, twofold. This increase in working hours for those actually working in paid
employment on a full-time basis comes at a time when we have continuing high unemployment and underemployment. 7 This double phenomenon of a large number of people underemployed or unemployed
at the same time as we have an increasing number of hours for those
employed, is the most stark presentation of the problem which Schor
is addressing. The third key empirical point which Schor makes is really the ace up her sleeve. She notes that in a 1985 survey about onethird of the working population would trade existing income-that is,
take a drop in pay-in order to attain shorter hours. 8 This is a re4. The key numbers appear in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of the book. OVERWORKED AMERICAN,
supra note 2, at 29-30.
5. Id. at 29.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 39.
8. Id at 129.
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markable statistic. But then Schor goes a great deal further. Relying
upon important research often overlooked by economists, she re-establishes that there is a striking difference between what people are
willing to give up to get something, as opposed to what future gains
they are willing to forego to get the same thing. The idea here is that
if you ask people not what percentage of their current pay they are
willing to give up for shorter hours, but rather what they would forego
in terms of future earnings, one comes up with some truly remarkable
figures. Schor reports that 84% of the population would like to trade
off some or all of their future income for additional free time. 9 Nearly
half said that they would trade all of a 10% pay raise for more free
time. 10 These are very interesting numbers indeed.
The second component of the book, and the project of the book,
is to explain these phenomena. This is the theoretical and ethical
center of the book, and here Schor makes considerable advances.
Schor deploys technical, and sometimes technical/legal arguments, but
more importantly, she stakes out some very broad theoretical claims
about the imperatives of capitalism in modem consumer society to
explain the empirical reality she has revealed. It is surely one of the
great accomplishments of Schor's work that the author is able to deal
both at the level of technical detail and, at the same time, at a broad
theoretical level with legal, psychological, and sociological as well as
numerous economic literatures.
The third fundamental element in the structure of the book is a
set of proposals for a way out of the bind in which we find ourselves.
This takes the form of a number of specific proposals for legal and
social reform.
In order to appreciate the specific proposals for reform, however,
it is necessary to set out in some greater detail the central arguments
Schor sets forth in the second section of the book, that is, the explanation of the phenomenon of the overworked American. I think this
central portion of the work is understood best in terms of the following matrix. What Schor has done is to explain both the supply side
and the demand side of the increased hours phenomenon. Put more
simply, and in language more customary for a labor lawyer, what
Schor has done is given us an account of employee thinking and employer thinking which would explain the rise in working hours. Within
each of these two sides of the matrix she has offered technical and
9. Id.
10. Id.
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detailed arguments as well as broad theoretical insight. She works
both sides of the matrix with equal ability. In the end her central
claim is to have revealed the "logic" or "immanent rationality" of the
modem U.S. version of capitalism from an employer's point of view,
while at the same time unpacking the "logic" or "immanent rationality" of capitalism when combined with North American consumerism,
from an employee's point of view. This focus on large and structural
issues forces Schor, in the end and correctly so, to confront some of
the central dilemmas of modern democratic capitalistic society. The
largest of these issues is, in my view, the debate over the proper relationship of politics and the market. That is, what is the proper domain
and scope of market ordering, particularly the market for labor? This
issue she confronts most bluntly, in what I think is perhaps the key
sentence in the book. In attacking certain advocates of pure market
ordering, she writes that they "have forgotten that the point of economic success is to make possible a good life. To impair the quality of
life in the name of economic success is foolhardy."" What Schor has
put a finger on here is the immortal question posed, among others, by
Polanyi in his famous work The Great Transformation-is society to
12
be subordinated to the market, or is it to be the other way around?
What then are Schor's contributions in unravelling the "inner
logic of capitalism" that would explain the drive for longer hours?
The major contributions, as I see them, are as follows. Schor's first
and fundamental point is that under capitalism workers do not sell
labor, but rather labor power, or time. As she strikingly puts it-time
has become a commodity.' 3 Her next point is that the labor market is
a buyer's market. 14 Economic models assume full employment, yet
we endure chronic high levels of unemployment and there are obvious
incentives in the system for employers to maintain less than full employment. This produces an "inequality of bargaining power", which
employers are able to use, in the absence of countervailing power (in
the form of unions, for example), to maintain the drive to longer
hours.' 5 In a world of unemployment a worker has a strong incentive
to keep his or her job because employers have made it more valuable.
This is the concept of "employment rent.' 6 While the impact of this
11. Id. at 154.
12. KARL POLANYI, Tim GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1975).
13. OVERWORKED AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 139.
14. Id. at 39, 71.
15. 1d at 126.
16. Id.at 65.
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high "employment rent" is to increase productivity, there is also a
strong incentive to increase workers' hours as opposed to sharing
work among others. Schor agrees that sharing work, and thus reducing unemployment, would have the effect of undermining the structural advantage which employers currently enjoy in the labor market.
If a move to shorter hours was successful, then the pool of unemployable would be smaller and employers would lose market power. Schor
perceives this "powerful consensus among business, government and
the economics profession. '17
In addition to this basic structural point, Schor lists a number of
more concrete and current employer incentives to have existing workers work longer hours, rather than hire more workers. Here, Schor
points to the role of fringe benefits in assigning longer hours to existing workers as opposed to hiring new workers. 18 Many fringe benefits are paid on a "per person" basis and thus represent a fixed cost.
Of particular importance is the cost of health care in the U.S. (as opposed to Canada). She then notes that certain governmentally administered programs have low ceilings on employer contributions so that
once a worker works a fixed number of hours no additional employer
contributions are demanded. 19 This structures a very significant incentive to increase the hours of existing employees rather than to hire
new employees and face the prospect of paying the employer contributions twice instead of once. In addition, other fixed costs, such as
training, have a similar impact. The increase of salaried rather than
hourly paid employment has expedited an employer's ability to demand and receive longer hours. 20 The "down turn" in the economy in
the 1980s led many employers to "downsize", which meant shifting the
same amount of work onto fewer people. 21
I turn now to Schor's analysis of the supply side of the longer
hours predicament-that is, the employees' point of view. Schor's
first point is that we must keep our eye on other related and important
background phenomena. She reminds us first of the drop in real pay
which workers in America have suffered, particularly over the decade
of the 1980s and second, of the diminution of union power and influence as well as the lack of other political organizations in favor of
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
ld. at
Id. at

76.
66.
68.
80.
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shorter hours. 2 Her book also develops at length the rise of two income families and the resulting impact upon work in the home.23
However, Schor's most important contribution comes, in my view, in
Chapter 5 which is entitled "The Insidious Cycle of Work-andSpend. '24 Here we arrive at the spiritual center of the book, if I may
put it that way. The central idea here is that happiness must consist in
liking what you have, not in aspiring to get what you do not already
have. Schor is of the view that there is an insatiable appetite for
spending (getting what we haven't got), which is a "specific product of
capitalism. ' 25 Schor further maintains that this insatiable appetite is
not a natural instinct. What Schor points to is that the phenomenon of
consuming and "keeping up with the Jones'" puts consumers in what
game theorists would describe as a "prisoner's dilemma. '26 Everyone
would be better off if he or she did not engage in this sort of competitive consumerism. But it is very difficult for any individual to disengage from this rat race. (So too, everyone in the office would be
better off if they did not compete with each other for longer hours.)
That is, in modem America, the socially optimal is not being obtained
by relentless pursuit of self-interest. What is required to solve any
prisoner's dilemma are channels of agreement and co-operation.
The central point Schor wishes to make is that the supply and
demand side merge to produce the phenomenon of longer and unwanted hours of work.27 The obvious idea here is that employers have
incentives to structure longer hours, and also desire consumers for
their products. Workers, as consumers, on the other hand, are drawn
into the cycle of "work and spend," and as workers have proved unable to establish the collective mechanisms to break out of the resulting spiral toward longer hours. This, it will be recalled, is in the teeth
of the data which establishes that a large majority of American workers wish to trade off some or all of their future income for additional
free time. When pressed with the obvious question, "why don't employees simply bargain to trade off future earnings for greater free
time?" Schor has provided the answer. Employees lack bargaining
power and, even if they had it, are locked in a prisoner's dilemma or
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
ld. at

24-28.
107-38.
117.
124.
121.
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collective action problem from which it is difficult for individuals to
emerge.
This brings us to the third of Schor's major contributions in which
she proposes a variety of ways out of this squirrel cage which we have
created for ourselves. It comes as no surprise that the answers to our
dilemma consist in altering both the employer (the demand side) and
the employee (supply side) incentives to longer hours. It also consists
in providing, legislatively, for the collective route out of the prisoner's
dilemma she has described. It is this agenda for reform which Schor
28
pursues in her paper on the Fair Labor StandardsAct (FLSA).
In her paper Schor describes the history of the FLSA and concludes that it was not designed to be and should not be understood as
a "shorter hours bill."' 29 The Act did not, and does not, establish maximum hours, but rather establishes what was supposed to be a financial disincentive to longer hours-the "time and one-half" overtime
premium for hours worked beyond 40 in a week. 30 This bit of legislative engineering backfired, however, as workers (especially men) became "addicted" to the overtime premium.31
To get over the basic structural barriers to shorter hours, Schor
proposes five specific amendments to the legislation. First, reduce the
40-hour workweek (without loss of pay) and eliminate the time and
one-half overtime premium.32 Second, require employers to permit
employees to trade wages for time off.33 Third, extend coverage of the
FLSA to a larger portion of the workforce. 34 Fourth, require a four
week paid vacation for all workers.3 5 Fifth, create a legal right to free
time and choice of hours. 36
These proposals for legislative reform are not offered in minute
detail and some, most clearly the last, are very sketchy proposals.
They remain a long way from the drafting stage. Thus, rather than
address the proposals inappropriately at a level of detail, I concentrate
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209.

29. Schor, supra note 1, at 164.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209.

31. Schor also notes the "mirage" of the overtime premium. In her view, the empirical
evidence establishes that when firms and workers come to rely on overtime premiums there is a

negative impact on the base rate. Thus, the premium is an illusion in that it comes at the expense
of basic wages. OVERWORKED AMmncAN, supra note 2, at 144.

32. Schor, supra note 1, at 167.
33. Id. at 168.
34. Id. at 170.

35. Id. at 171.
36. Id.
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on what might be learned at a general level from the Canadian experience with such proposals.

II. Ti

CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

Canada should provide an interesting point of comparison for
Schor's reform agenda. Canada and the United States share legal and
economic cultures which are sufficiently similar to make comparisons
realistic and meaningful. On the other hand there is sufficient divergence in regulatory policy regarding the labor market to view Canada
as something of an experimental laboratory for at least some of
Schor's ideas.
I must begin with a technical footnote that under Canada's version of federalism, regulation of labor relations and labor law are primarily and fundamentally matters for the provinces and not for the
federal government. While there are broad similarities in the labor
laws of the various provinces, particularly regarding collective bargaining law, there are vast differences in details regarding hours of
work regulation across the country. As a result it is impossible to give
37
a brief and, at the same time, systematic view of Canadian law. I
have instead chosen to use the law of Ontario, Canada's largest, most
populated, and disproportionately economically important province as
an example. This strategy has the added benefit of letting me speak of
the law of the province in which I live and work as a labor law academic. In addition, it is in Ontario that the issue of hours of work has
been most studied in ways relevant to the problems which Schor
raises.
Hours of work has been, and is today, an issue of ongoing importance in Ontario and Canada. In 1987, an Ontario Task Force on
Hours of Work and Overtime published a lengthy report on this
38
subject.
What is the Canadian reality? Could one write a book entitled
the Overworked Canadian? If not, is this attributable in some way to
37. See INNIS CrIMSTIE ET AL, ENeLoYMENF LAW IN CANADA 187-427 (2d ed. 1993), for
detailed treatment.
38. ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON HOURS OF WORK AND OVERTIME, WORKING TIMES: THE
REPORT OF THE ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON HOURS OF WORK AND OVERTIME (1987) [hereinaf-

ter ONTARIO TASK FORCE]. The federal government has also established, this year, another task
force on hours of work. Its recently released report entitled WORKING TIME AND THE DiSTRIMuTION OF WORK does not, in my view, add to or differ from the earlier Ontario Reports data or
analysis in a substantial manner. ADVISORY GROUP ON WORKING TIME AND THE DisTRMUTnON
OF WORK, REPORT OF TmE ADVISORY GROUP ON WORKING TIm AND THE DisTnmurnoN OF
WoRK

(1994).

1994]

THE OVERWORKED CANADIAN?

Canada's different labor law regime regarding hours of work? Does
that regime incorporate the sorts of reforms which Schor proposes?
The answers to these complex questions require careful development.
In what follows I offer a brief and sketchy account of the sort of answers one might expect.
A. The Overworked Canadian?
There is, as I have indicated, anecdotal support, especially among
members of the legal profession, for the thesis that Canadians are as
overworked as Schor believes their American counterparts to be. But
does the Canadian data support the sort of dramatic conclusions
drawn by Schor to the effect that over the past 20 years full-time
workers in the United States have increased their work load to the
tune of one month per year? As far as I can detect there is no systematic support for a Canadian counterpart to Schor's startling
conclusion.
The common view in Canada is that by 1960 the "standard workweek" had fallen from 64 hours per week in 187039 to 37-40 hours
over five days. 4° Almost all reductions in weekly hours occurred by
1960 when the standard workweek levelled off and stabilized. It is the
case that while the standard workweek has stabilized, two other phenomena have taken hold. First, during the period since 1960:
[P]aid holidays and vacation time increased so that standard weekly
hours continued to decline at the historical trend rate of about two
hours weekly per decade. In other words, the downward trend in
hours of work continued its historical decline but simply changed its
form, from a declining workweek to increased holiday and vacation
time.41

39. O rAIo TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 13.
40. Deborah Sunter & Ren6 Morissette, The Hours People Work, PaRSP. ON LAB. & INcoME, Autumn 1994, at 8.
41. ONrAmo TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 13.
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This latter claim is supported by the following table:
TABLE 142
HOLIDAYS AND VACATIONS IN ALL INDUSTRIES
(OFFICE AND NON-OFFICE COMBINED)

Year

Holidays
(days per year)
weighted average

Vacations
(weeks per year)
weighted average

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

8.65
8.76
8.75
8.99
9.24
9.47
9.60
9.73
9.87
9.96
10.38
10.53
10.60
10.73
10.86
10.97
11.09
11.10
11.10
11.12
11.09

2.93
2.96
2.98
3.03
3.06
3.10
3.18
3.28
3.34
3.41
3.50
3.54
3.59
3.62
3.63
3.71
4.19
4.26
4.29
4.30
4.27

Second, while the standard workweek has stabilized, it is true that
fewer people are working it. More people are working shorter hours,
i.e., part-time, and more people are working longer hours. There is in
Canada a phenomenon of a "declining middle," that is, a decline in
the number of people working the standard workweek and an increase on both sides of that norm. The greatest impact is that caused
by workers working less than the standard workweek, i.e., part-time
workers. In Canada about 60% of jobs created in 1993 were part-time
jobs, and since 1975 the number of part-time workers has more than
42. Chan Aw, A StatisticalSupplement to the Standard Hours of Work Study, LAB. CANADA,
Sept. 1986, reprinted in PREM BENm ADurn, CoMPENsAnoN REsE.smc1I CENrR, HouRs OF
WoaR TRENDs AND ArrrTuDEs IN CANADA 5 (1987).
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doubled, representing a shift from 11% to 17% of total employment.4 3
However, a lot of part-time work is involuntary. The proportion of
part-time workers who would prefer to be full-time has risen from
11% in 1975 to 35% in 1993. 4" The impact of increased part-time employment can be seen in the overall reduction of average hours
worked per week as illustrated by the following table:
45

TABLE 2
AVERAGE ACTUAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK

Year

Average Hours
Worked (all jobs)

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

39.3
39.1
38.2
37.8
37.3
37.1
37.1
36.9
36.9
36.0
35.4
35.4
35.7
35.7
35.1
34.6
34.4
34.5
34.5
34.8

43. Nathalie Noreau, Involuntary Part-Timers,PERSP.

ON LAB. & INCOME,

Autumn 1994, at

25.
44.

45.

it

BENIMADHU, supra note 42, at 5; STATISTcs CANADA, LABOUR FORCE ANNUAL
AVERAGES: 1975-83, at 279-87 (1984); STATISTICS CANADA, TiH LABOUR FORCE: DECEMBER
1984, at 118 (1985); STATISTICS CANADA, TmE LABOUR FORCE: DECEMBER 1985, at 112 (1986).
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The overall "hour glassing" effect of both of these changes (i.e.
increased shorter hours (part-time) and increased longer hours) can
be grasped from the following table:

Ti

TABLE 346
DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL* WORK TiME, CANADA,

1976-1992
(number of workers in the thousands)
1976

1985

1990

1992

Part-time (1-29 hours)
(% of total)
Full-time (30-49 hours)
(% of total)

1,483
16.9
6,151
69.9

2,101
19.5
7,051
65.3

2,358
20.3
7,399
63.6

2,475
21.4
7,278
63.0

Full-time (50 or more)
(% of total)
Total
Total Persons**

1,164
13.2
8,798
9,477

1,640
15.2
10,792
11,339

1,868
16.1
11,625
12,248

1,801
15.6
11,554
12,150

*

Refers to total of all hours worked at all jobs in reference week, i.e., actual hours worked.

** Total persons includes people working 0 hours in reference week.

These figures are, however, rather crude because the middle category of full-time workers spreads over a large range of 30-49 hours
per week. Other and more recent data help quantify the change in the
distribution of those working the standard workweek. In 1976, 71%
of paid workers put in 35-40 hours per week. 47 But in 1993 this percentage had dropped to 61%.48 A large portion of this change is attributable to the use of part-time employment as shown in the
following table:

46. STATISTICS CANADA, LABOUR FORCE ANNUAL AVERAGES: 1975-1983, at 262 (1984);
STATISTICS CANADA, TmE LABOUR FORCE: DECEMBER 1985, at 52 (1986); STATISTICS CANADA,

Tim

LABOUR FORCE: DECEMBER 1990, at
FORCE: DECEMBER 1992, at B-35 (1993).

B-34 (1991);

47. Sunter & Morissette, supra note 40, at 10.

48. Id.

STATISTICS CANADA, TM LABOUR

THE OVERWORKED CANADIAN?

1994]

TABLE 449

DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES BY USUAL WEEKLY HOURS
WORKED AT MAIN JOB, 1976 TO 1993
(SELECrED YEARS)

Usual Weekly Hours

1976
Youths
Adult men
Adult women
1981

Youths
Adult men
Adult women

1984
Youths
Adult men
Adult women

-

1989
Youths
Adult men
Adult women
1993
Youths
Adult men
Adult women

1-34

35-40

41 and over

Average
Hours Worked

16
24
4
28
18
28
4
30
21
35
5
30
21
40
5
29
24
51
8
31

71
66
77
66
69
62
77
64
67
55
75
64
65
51
73
63
61
40
70
61

13
10
19
6
12
10
18
5
13
9
19
6
14
10
21
7
14
8
22
8

37.6
34.9
41.1
34.1
36.9
34.0
40.8
33.6
36.5
32.4
40.8
33.6
36.6
31.5
41.1
34.2
36.0
28.7
40.8
34.0

Source: Labour Force Survey. Note: Youths: 15-24 years; adult men and women: 25 years and
over.

As these figures indicate, there has been an increase in the
number of people working longer hours among adult men (19%
worked 41 hours or more per week in 1976, rising to 22% in 1993) and
adult women (an increase from 6% to 8% over the same time period).
However, the percentage of adult men and adult women working
shorter hours over the same periods also increased.
All of this suggests that the phenomenon of increased hours for
full-time employees is comparatively more concentrated among a
smaller group of Canadian workers. This rough judgment is substantiated by more detailed findings by the 1987 Ontario Task Force. Data
49. Id.
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compiled for that Task Force and covering the period 1975-85 is set
out in the following table. It should be noted that the prime impetus
for the establishment of the Task Force was the notion that high overtime rates could be, with proper redistributive policies, transmuted
into lower unemployment rates. As the Task Force put it:
The immediate impetus for the Task Force was that substantial
amounts of overtime appeared to exist at the same time that other
workers were unemployed or on layoff, often in the same establishment. There was the hope that restricting the amount of overtime
work done by some workers would lead to new-job creation for
others.50
The Task Force found that the average overtime per worker in
Ontario was one hour per week. 5 1 However, the distribution of this
overtime was very uneven and heavily concentrated with most workers working no overtime and 13% of the workforce averaging above 8
hours of overtime per week on a regular basis. 52 The basic data uncovered by the Task Force is reflected in the following table:
TABLE 553
PER CENT OF WORKFORCE AVERAGING SHORT AND

LONG HOURS, ONTARIO,

1975-1985

Per Cent of Workforce Averaging
1-29 Over 40 Over 44 Over 48
Year Hours Hours Hours
Hours
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

14.8
15.9
16.1
14.9
15.3
16.0
17.1
18.0
17.9
17.6
17.5

20.6
18.8
19.4
20.5
21.1
20.3
19.7
19.0
21.1
22.2
22.6

15.3
14.3
14.6
15.6
16.1
15.3
14.9
14.6
16.4
17.5
17.8

9.0
8.4
8.8
9.4
9.9
9.6
9.3
9.3
10.6
11.1
11.4

Average
Weekly Hours

Unemployment
Rate (%)

37.1
36.5
36.6
37.2
37.4
36.9
36.4
36.3
36.6
36.8
36.9

5.9
6.0
6.8
6.9
6.2
6.6
6.3
9.7
10.3
8.8
7.8

Source: Reid (1987a, Table 5 and appendix tables). The original data source was unpublished
tabulations from Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey.
50. OmrnIo TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1.
51. 1l at 5
52. Id.

53. Id. at 15.
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Thus, in 1985, 22.6% of the total workforce averaged more than 41
hours per week, 17.8% more than 44 hours per week, and 11.4% more
than 48 hours per week. While the increase in those working longer
hours was "pronounced" 5 4 between 1956 and 1985 (a 20% increase in
those working more than 40 hours), the absolute percentages are relatively low-about 1 in 5 workers work more than 40 hours per week.
Those who worked longer hours did so regularly. The Task Force
found that "[o]verall the bulk of long hours is in the managerial/professional and processing occupations and, to a lesser extent, the sales
and service occupations. ' 55 The managerial/professional group accounted for 38.3% of those working over 40 hours and 44.3% of those
56
working more than 48 hours.
How does this compare with Schor's data? Schor's claims seem
to be much more dramatic and profound. She writes that "[i]n 1990
one-fourth of all full-time workers spent forty-nine or more hours on
the job each week. Of these, almost half [1/2 of 25% = 12.5%] were at
'57
work sixty hours or more.
One difficulty here is that Schor's figures are expressed as percentages of full-time workers. Much of the data I have referred to is
not so expressed. However, the Canadian data contained in Table 4
above on the degree of departure from the standard workweek (defined as 37-40 hours per week) indicates that 22% of men work longer
hours and 8% of women. Rough estimates from the data from Table 5
indicate that in 1985 about one-half (i.e. 11% or so) of those working
longer hours worked fewer than 48 hours, and one-half (11%) more
than 48 hours per week. There is no data collected on those working
more than 60 hours. Nonetheless, the data would suggest, prima facie,
that conclusions approximately one-half as dramatic as Schor's are justified in Canada. That is, on a rough conversion to consider only fulltime workers, 13.8% or so work more than 48 hours in Canada as
compared with 25% working 49 hours or more in the United States.
On the other hand, much else about the story which Schor relates
concerning American workers is true in Canada. For example, during
the 1980s and 1990s "virtually no growth has occurred in the real
wages of full-time, full-year workers. 5 8 But, as we have noticed, va54. Id. at 14
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 17, 18 (see chart).
57. OVERWORKED AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 30.

58. Sunter & Morissette, supra note 40, at 11 (more accurately, the real wages of males
dropped and the real wages of females increased resulting in an overall record of no growth).
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cation and holiday entitlements have increased during this period. 59
Moonlighting is another phenomenon to which Schor has drawn attention. According to her data in 1989 about 6% of the employed
reported two or more jobs, but she adds that the real number is perhaps twice as high when one takes into account the impact on reporting rates of tax evasion, illegal services, and employer disapproval of
second jobs. 60 In Canada the numbers seem to be very similar. From
1977-93 the "official" percentage of Canadian workers engaged in
61
moonlighting rose from 2.5% to 5%, one-half of whom are women.
Other aspects of the Canadian reality also fit with Schor's description. Fringe benefits in Canada are, in general, paid on a per person basis and not pro-rated to hours worked. This structure results in
the same set of incentives from employers to increase the number of
hours of those already working, which Schor notes to be an important
contribution to the long hours phenomenon in American life. In addition, social programs in Canada (such as unemployment insurance and
workers compensation) which require employer contributions are typically tied to a fixed ceiling per employee. Further, the Ontario Task
Force has made the same point as Schor concerning the results of
these low ceilings. 62 It must be kept in mind, however, that in Canada
health care is not a payroll item. The universal scheme of health care
is paid from general government resources.
Perhaps most crucial, in light of what I have to say below, union
density rates have not fallen in Canada as precipitously as they have in
the United States. Union coverage has fallen everywhere in the
United States, including in its "traditional bastions. '63 Current estimates put American union coverage at about 12% of the workforce. 64
By comparison, "there has been virtually no decline in overall union
density in Canada in recent years. '65 It remains at about 37%.66
There has been some debate in Canada about the extent to which significant unionization rates in the public sector mask a decline in the
59. See supra p. 182, table 1.
60. OVERWORKED AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 31.
61. Gary L. Cohen, Ever More Moonlighters, PERSP. ON LAB. & INCOME, Autumn 1994, at
31.
62. OrARIO TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 77-78.
63. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 9 (1990).
64. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation
From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production,94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 758 (1994).
65. See Noah Meltz & Anil Verma, Developments in Industrial Relations and Human Resource Practices in Canada: An Update from the 1980s, in EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (Thomas A. Kochan et al. eds., forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at
4, on file with author).

66. ld. at 17.
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private sector rates. While it is true that private sector union density
has declined in Canada, this decline was "much less precipitous" than
67
that in the United States.
B.

CanadianLaw

Thus, while Canada and the United States share many common
phenomena in their labor market features, there are differences. For
our purposes, the most significant difference is that, at least at first
glance, while there has been an increase in long hours worked in Canada, it does not seem to have been as dramatic as in the United States.
Can this difference be attributed to Canadian law or other differences
in Canadian labor market regulation?
First and foremost, Ontario law does, unlike American law, provide for a statutory maximum number of hours of work. 68 The Employment StandardsAct's predecessor legislation was the FactoriesAct
of 1884, which limited hours of work for women and youth to ten
hours a day and sixty hours a week. 69 In 1941, the Hours of Work and
Vacation With Pay Act reduced the maximum number of hours for all
employees to eight a day and forty-eight a week. 70 This is the statutory maximum which remains the law in Ontario. The statutory maximum number of hours a day and the number of hours a week is made
legislatively concrete by, among other things, expressly creating for all
workers the individual right to refuse hours over eight a day and fortyeight a week. 71 Flexibility for employers and workers was built into
the system, however, through what has evolved into a complex system
of permits issued by the administrative agency charged with the task
of implementing and enforcing the legislation, the Employment Standards Branch of the Ministry of Labor. 72 There are three types of
permits-annual permits allowing 100 excess hours of work for each
worker in a year which are issued virtually "automatically;" 73 industry
permits for certain industries usually operating on a twenty-four "hour
round-the-clock' basis;74 and special permits for extraordinary situations. 75 The permits, however, merely allow the worker and the em67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E.14 (1990) (Can.), as amended.
See generally OrAmo TAsK FORCE, supra note 38, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
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ployer to agree to longer hours-the employee still has the right to
refuse hours beyond eight a day and forty-eight a week.
Ontario does have an overtime premium of time and one-half.
This premium is payable after forty-four hours a week, and not per
day. 7 6 Ontario also requires annual two week vacations with pay for
all workers77 and by statute provides for eight paid statutory
78
holidays.
The administration of the Employment Standards Act,79 which
contains these entitlements and sets out the administrative procedure
for their enforcement is, from the employee's point of view, "cost
free." Investigators from the Employment Standards Branch investigate and carry forward employee complaints. Court enforcement is
not part of the Canadian system.
Canada has thus enacted some of the reforms suggested by Schor.
I am not suggesting that Canada has enacted any of the particular
reforms that Schor has just outlined in her paper on the Fair Labor
StandardsAct. Indeed, I do not think that Canada has enacted any of
these proposals in the exact form in which she suggests. The point is,
however, that Canada has some significant differences in its labor law
regarding hours of work and these differences address some of the
general problems Schor raises in her work. Most dramatically, in Canada, there is a statutory right to refuse longer hours.
It may be tempting, then, to attribute the difference in the Canadian experience to these differences in Canadian employment standards law. Furthermore, a thrust of Schor's paper is that by rewriting
general labor market statutes, such as the FairLabor StandardsAct in
America, or the Employment Standards Act in Ontario, one can
achieve workplace reform of the sort Schor is promoting. This is not
an obvious proposition.
Let me explain these remarks which are directed to the general
thrust of Schor's reform proposals, not to their detail. The question,
which is central to Schor's reform proposals, is whether life in the
workplace can be improved to any great extent through the passage of
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act or such statutes.
The first problem is that such statutes are well known for their
incomplete coverage. The Ontario Task Force noted that only one76. R.S.O., ch. E.14, § 17.
77. Id. § 28.
78. Id. § 25.

79. Id. §§ 59-75.
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half of those working overtime hours were covered by the Ontario
legislation.8 0 Indeed, this is one of Schor's major points about the
need for reform of the legislation. Its coverage should be greatly expanded to cover more of those who are working long hours. But even
if these reforms were undertaken, we would still be left with a more
fundamental dilemma of workplace regulation.
Let me begin my description of this dilemma by noting that, for
labor lawyers, analysis begins with the insight that there are three
legal regimes governing workplace relations. The first regime is the
common law of the employment relationship.8 1 The second regime is
that of collective bargaining. The third regime is that of direct statutory intervention, such as that contained in the Fair Labor Standards
Act in the United States and the Employment StandardsAct in Ontario. While from an analytical point of view this "three regimes" analysis is impeccable, it turns out that from a pragmatic "real world" point
of view, life is more complicated.
The third regime, the regime of "direct statutory intervention"
turns out not to be a regime of labor market regulation at all. Put
simply, the Employment StandardsAct in Ontario is not an independent mechanism for regulating ongoing relationships between employers and workers. As the Ontario Task Force put it, "[n]oncompliance
with long-hours provisions appears to be prominent in Ontario. '8 2
This has been attributed to a number of factors. For a labor lawyer,
however, one reason is glaringly obvious. Individual workers are not
well situated to exercise statutory rights, even the very explicit statutory rights to refuse long hours set out in the Ontario Employment
StandardsAct. They are not in a position to enforce such rights for
the very reason that such rights were thought to be legislatively required in the first place. This is not a difficult insight. The belief
which underlies enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Employment Standards Act is that which animates all of our labor
law-the belief that individual workers in most labor markets are not
in a position to obtain basic and just workplace entitlements known as
80. ONTARIo TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 5.
81. Here there are large differences between Canadian common law and American common law. Canada has never known, for example, the "at will" doctrine. Employees dismissed

without cause are entitled to "reasonable notice" or "pay in lieu" of that notice from their employer. For employees with a few years of seniority, this will amount to several months of salary
payment. For employees with some years of seniority, notice periods of one year are extremely
common. In cases of extremely lengthy seniority, notice periods of 18-24 months are not known.
See CrmusTm, supra note 37, for other important differences.
82. ONTARIo TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 6
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"terms and conditions of employment." As controversial as this may
appear to some, there is no doubt that as a matter of social reality this
is the motivating factor behind such legislation.
But passage of legislation such as the Employment StandardsAct
merely pushes this problem back one stage. The problem now becomes, who will have the power to enforce new statutory rights? As it
turns out, and not surprisingly, statutory rights are, in Canada, most
effectively exercised by unionized workforces. That is, the "third" regime turns out to be ineffective unless coupled with the second regime
of collective bargaining. Unorganized workers overwhelmingly make
use of employment standards entitlements only after they have been
dismissed from employment. It is for these workers a post-employment set of entitlements. The Employment Standards Act is not an
ongoing regime of labor market regulation for non-unionized employees while they are employees. This phenomenon is well documented
in Canada in connection with a number of statutory regimes and is
given its best expression and documentation by Roy Adams in his
study of the Employment StandardsAct in Ontario. 83 As Adams reported, "very few regular employees ever file employment standards
grievances ....Instead, the great majority of complaints are filed by
people who have left the employer against whom the complaint is
filed ....[T]he Employment Standards Branch is primarily a collection agency." 4 This is true in spite of the strong protection provided
by the Act to complaining employees who are the victims of employer
retaliation. 85
The basic lesson is that statutory non-compliance is regular and
that statutes are effective only if workers are empowered independently to enforce them. What lessons should we draw from these Canadian conclusions? Given the brevity of the analysis presented here
perhaps not more than the notion that more work needs to be done.
What is hinted at here is, however, a seemingly large and obvious
truth. The labor relations and labor system of a state is a system-a
system in which the parts are interrelated, are reinforced by and in
return reinforce other parts, and in which the components make sense
only when considered in a systemic way. It is not an accident that
Canada is a country with both the sort of direct statutory entitlements
Schor advocates and a less moribund collective labor law regime. The
83. Roy J. Adams, Employment Standards in Ontario: An Industrial Relations Systems
Analysis, 42 Rlt INDUSTRIELLEs 46 (1987).
84. Id. at 51.
85. This protection includes reinstatement.
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political culture which creates such statutes is the same culture which
has sustained a more vibrant collective labor law reality. And the effectiveness of those statutes depends upon the same forces. And so
on. The lights of labor law reform do not turn on to full intensity one
at a time. Rather, as one philosopher said, "[f]ight dawns gradually
over the whole."6
This point must, however, be kept in perspective. More specifically, it is a point which is at least implicit in The Overworked American. In fact, one of Schor's main contributions is to emphasize that
overwork is a complex social, cultural, and economic problem. It will
not be cured by a wave of the legislative pen. This is not to say that
reform advocacy of the sort Schor undertakes in her paper is headed
in the wrong direction. I do not believe that at all. The point is that
such efforts must be seen as part of a larger project. And when law
reform is secured, it will not only be a means to social change, but also
the result of it.

86.

LUDWIG WrrrENSTEIN, ON CERTAI'TY

141 (1969).

